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TRANSFER OF ARMS TO COMBATANTS AND
THE CONTROL OF FORCE: THE ARAB-ISRAELI
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David P. Forsythe*
The arms race by parties to the Arab-Israeli conflict has reached
staggering proportions. The question naturally arises as to the role of
international law and organization in regulating the supply of arms to
governments and guerrillas in that conflict situation. On the one hand,
the scope and danger of the arms race is evident. Even before the 1967
war, Middle East governments had received approximately ten times as
much military hardware as Latin American governments,' despite the
fact that Latin American politics are also prone to violence. And while
there is controversy over the value of military hardware supplied to the
Middle Eastern region since the 1967 war, it can be easily demonstrated
that the arms race has escalated in almost every dimension.! On the
other hand, international law and organization have demonstrated no
great capacity for regulating arms transfer throughout the international
political system in the period since 1945. Thus the question is posed
whether the dangers of the Arab-Israeli conflict in the 1970's might lead
to a breakthrough in the regulation of arms to combatants. This basic
inquiry necessitates examination of the fundamental obstacles to arms
control and a determination of whether these obstacles preclude any
form of arms control and any positive role for international law and
organization.
PRIMARY OBSTACLE: THE NATURE OF THE POLITICAL SYSTEM
The fundamental obstacle to arms control of any legal or institution-
alized nature is the fact that the Arab-Israeli conflict constitutes a revo-
lutionary zone in the Middle East political system. Where there is little
limitation on ends and means and where there is little moderation of
objectives and tactics, there will be little relevancy for a formal restraint
*Assistant Professor of Political Science, Georgia State University.
'See J. HUREWITZ, MIDDLE EAST POLITICS: THE MILITARY DIMENSION 3-6 (1969); cf NADAV
SAFRAN, Appendix C in FROM WAR TO WAR: THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFRONTATION 1948-1967,
(1967).
'See generally J. HUREWITZ, supra note 1; cf. Christian Science Monitor, Apr. 1, 1971, at 19,
col. I. One view estimated Soviet arms to the U.A.R. in 1970 to be worth $2,500 million. For U.S.
views of Soviet shipments of arms for 1967-1969, see N.Y. Times, Jan. 25, 1970, § E, at 4, col. 1.
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system. It is unfortunate but true that in the Arab-Israeli conflict there
has been slight agreement on the nature of regional order desired; thus
there has been slight obligation toward restraining norms.'
A number of actors in Middle East politics can be termed revolution-
ary. The Soviet Union, the main supplier of arms to those advocating
revolutionary change, must be regarded as a regional actor for purposes
of this analysis. And Soviet foreign policy toward the Arab-Israeli con-
flict and the Middle East in general is one of "controlled revolution."
Indeed, the Middle East is now the main area where the Soviet Union
hopes to change the previous status quo that was favorable to the West.'
The Soviets have long regarded arms transfer as a useful instrument of
influence-building in the Third World of Afro-Asia, and the Arab-
Israeli zone of the Middle East is of primary importance to the Soviets
in that general quest for influence. It is probable that the Soviets have
yet to attain military parity with the West in either the Mediterranean
or Indian Ocean areas.7 And it is probable that Soviet clients have yet
to attain bilateral parity with Israel.' Thus there is little reason to expect
the Soviet Union to be content with the status quo and seek formal
controls on arms shipments to the region. Soviet public endorsement of
arms control in the region has not been followed up by serious negotia-
tion in private with the United States.9
There are factors in the Arab-Israeli conflict that lead the Soviets into
3For an excellent treatment of this subject see Hoffmann, International Systems and Interna-
tional Law, in THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM 205 (1961). For purposes of present analysis, revolu-
tion is defined as the quest for extensive, imminent, and frequently violent change.
'See generally Falk, Respect for International Law and Confidence in Disarmament, in 4 THE
STRATEGY OF WORLD ORDER: DISARMAMENT AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 354 (1966).
51t has become dangerous for the U.S.S.R. to challenge the European status quo, and in Asia
the Soviets cannot be sure that alteration of the status quo would not work to Chinese advantage.
But in the Middle East, Western commitments are ill-defined, and the Chinese influence is weak.
The region is a natural gateway to East Africa and the Indian Ocean area.
'See W. JOSHUA & S. GIBERT, ARMS FOR THE THIRD WORLD: SOVIET MILITARY AID DIPLOMACY
(1969).
7See Martin, The Changing Military Balance, in SOVIET-AMERICAN RIVALRY IN THE MIDDLE
EAST 61 (J. Hurewitz ed. 1969); Christian Science Monitor, Nov. 18, 1970, at 13, col. I.
'Operational parity must necessarily be subjective. Thus it is problematical whether or not Israel
would now be deterred from the type of preemptive strike it used in 1967 because of Russian
SAM's and Russian pilots in the U.A.R. It is probable that such a strike would now be more costly;
in that sense the U.A.R. may be approaching parity. Remaining is the problem of defining what
would be unacceptable levels of cost for Israel.
'A 1967 Soviet draft resolution in the Security Council containing reference to arms control
seemed to be a guise to get Western support for the draft. See A. LALL, THE UN AND THE MIDDLE
EAST CRISIS 1967, at 256-57 (1968).
A Kosygin statement calling for a halt to the regional arms race was couched in abrasive terms
hardly conducive to serious negotiation on the subject. See N.Y. Times, July 2, 1968, at 2, col. 3.
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a prudent challenge to the West rather than a reckless one. There is the
danger of some form of direct confrontation with the United States,
which has been perceived as being to neither superpower's advantage.
There is the danger that the Chinese will successfully penetrate the
region themselves and that the Soviets may need to cooperate in some
way with the West to check the Chinese. There is the danger that the
various Arab groups will "waste" Soviet military investments through
premature actions, thus leading to political repercussions for Soviet
leaders in the Kremlin. And it could be argued that out of these factors
will come a Soviet desire for restraining the arms traffic on a mutually
agreed basis. It is suggested here, however, that still other factors in the
political system make this an unlikely contingency.
The Palestinian movement to regain Arab control of Palestine is one
of these factors. Apparently Soviet leaders have perceived an ideological
need to give official support to Palestinian claims of anti-imperialism
and pro-national self-determination.'" And while the Soviets have been
less than consistent in their position vis-a-vis the Palestinians, the Sovi-
ets have supplied arms to the Palestinian guerrillas indirectly, i.e.,
through various Arab governments." The Soviets have tried to restrain
the guerrillas at various times and have "re-interpreted" fedayeen
claims because of Palestinian rashness that conflicts with some Soviet
objectives." But in spite of this conflict of interest the Soviet Union has
continued to supply the guerrillas with conventional small arms. It has
perceived that keeping the Palestinian question before both Middle East
elites and masses helps to keep the area anti-Western, in that Zionism
is pictured as a front for Western imperialism. "Controlled tension,"
therefore, has been seen by the Soviets as facilitating their penetration
of the Middle East. 13
Like the Palestinians, the "progressive" Arab states that are military
clients of the Soviet Union have a revolutionary input into the political
system that reinforces the basic Soviet tendency to challenge the pre-
vious order. Syria, Iraq, Algeria, and Libya give public endorsement to
"See, e.g., Dmitriev, The Arab World and Israel's Aggression, 9 INT'L AFFAIRS 20, 23 (Sept.
1970). "Palestinian guerrilla activity in the occupied area and other forms of resistance to the
invaders are undoubtedly justified." Id. at 23.
"For a public commentary on arms to the Palestinians, see Christian Science Monitor, July 13,
1970, at 5, col. 4.
"
2 The Soviets seem aware that some guerrilla actions-by encouraging Israel to maintain control
of the territories for security reasons-thwart Soviet efforts to achieve Israeli withdrawal. In
addition to Dmitriev, supra note 10, also see Kruglov, The Palestine Liberation Movement, N.Y.
Times, Sept. 17, 1969, at 13, col. I.
"See generally Campbell, The Soviet Union and the Middle East, "In the General Direction
of the Persian Gulf" Part 11, 29 RUSSIAN REV. 247 (1970).
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the revolutionary claims of the Palestinians, thus helping to keep alive
the ideology of anti-Zionism. Moreover, these states provide direct sup-
port to the guerrillas in many ways. Yet, these states at times fail to
follow the directives of Soviet policy and prove exceedingly resistent to
Soviet pressures. 4 Thus the Soviets find themselves providing arms aid
to all of these but Libya, plus non-military aid; but these sizable invest-
ments have not led to extensive influence for the U.S.S.R. on a number
of issues. 5 Yet, most governments find it difficult to cut commitments;
and aid, once undertaken, is difficult to end. The Soviet Union is no
exception in its dealings with the "progessives."' I Having established
itself as "big brother" to Arab causes, the Soviet Union finds it difficult
to extract itself from undesirable ventures for fear of losing face and
friends. 7
Related to these considerations of why the Arab-Israeli conflict has
helped transform Middle East politics into a revolutionary system is the
pertinent fact that the Soviets are not the only arms supplier in the area,
and they may supply arms in part to compete with other backers of
revolutionary causes. 8 China, since the end of its cultural revolution,
has shown renewed interest in the Middle East and has supplied the
Palestinians with small arms via Iraq. 9 This Chinese role, especially in
the context of the more general Sino-Soviet conflict, makes it difficult
for the Soviet Union to enter arms control agreements. The Soviets are
already being charged with revisionism of Marxism-Leninism and collu-
sion with the West. Thus they must worry about "keeping up with the
Maos" and maintaining a revolutionary appearance among those who
"Unsuccessful Soviet efforts to get Syrians to adopt less radical views, such as indorsement of
Security Council Resolution S/242 (1967), can be followed in N.Y. Times, May 13, 1969, at 13,
col. 1; July 5, 1969, at I, col. 7; and Aug. 13, 1970, at 6, col. 4.
15See generally W. LAQUEUR, THE STRUGGLE FOR THE MIDDLE EAST 184 passim (1969).
6Hence, should the U.S.S.R. desire to extract itself from support of certain Arab policies, it
would face similar problems to those confronting the U.S. as it tries to extract itself from extensive
support of Saigon.
'"An important complication in this situation is that some perhaps less revolutionary Arab
parties, such as the U.A.R., may request arms from the Soviet Union for what appears to be
legitimate defense needs, thus bringing pressure to bear on the supplier to provide arms for
ostensibly nonrevolutionary purposes. This analysis would also relate to the Jordanian requests to
the U.S. and U.K. On the importance of the problem of distinguishing legitimate security interests
for arms control, see Kemp, Arms Traffic and Third World Conflicts, [1970] INT'L CONCILIATION,
No. 577, 7, 70 passim. In general, Third World governments have shown little interest in arms
control on controversial weapons. See generally Issues Before the 25th General Assembly: Disar-
mament and Arms Control, [1970] INT'L CONCILIATION, No. 579, at 31.
"For a discussion of the problem of arms control regulation when there are many suppliers of
arms, see D. EDWARDS, ARMS CONTROL IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1969).
"See Christian Science Monitor, July 13, 1970, at 5, col. 5.
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espouse a revolutionary ideology."0 Then too, France has not been con-
tent with the status quo in the Middle East under both the De Gaulle
and Pompidou governments. While the thrust of French policy has been
directed more towards undermining United States influence than to-
wards support of regional revolutionary elements per se, French interest
in supplying arms to Libya, Tunisia, and others complicates an already
complicated situation .2 The French role is basically analogous to the
Chinese position in that the readiness of these secondary suppliers to
provide arms reduces the incentive of the primary suppliers to halt or
reduce their arms flow, for the recipients could obtain the arms else-
where.22
Thus the Arab-Israeli zone of Middle East politics is indeed revolu-
tionary, with revolutionary elements in the region requesting arms and
with suppliers from outside the region willing to support violent chal-
lengers to the present order.2 3 In this context, the prospects for formal,
institutionalized restraints on arms transfer are not encouraging.
SECONDARY OBSTACLE: THE NATURE OF THE LEGAL ORDER
Law is generally a dependent variable, and the nature of the interna-
tional legal order is derivative from the nature of international politics. 4
Still, one can identify certain characteristics of the legal order, even if
they exist as dependent rather than independent variables. The Arab-
Israeli conflict and the question of arms control brings a number of
these characteristics into sharp relief.
Some law, especially the law of the United Nations Charter, is so
2 For a thorough treatment of this consideration in Soviet foreign policies, see A. UtAM, THE
UNFINISHED REVOLUTION (1964).
2 For a recent review of French global arms policies, see Christian Science Monitor, Jan. 19,
1971, at 9, col. I.
"Arms flow to the Middle East is further complicated by private transactions. Although the
number of private sellers has decreased since World War II, state purchase of arms from private
dealers is not inconsequential in the area, as demonstrated by J. HUREWITZ, supra note I, at 438-
39. Non-state purchases are also important. The Palestinian groups have been able to make private
purchases through wealthy Palestinians in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.
"It is to be stressed that, while the overall context is revolutionary, arms needs for non-
revolutionary, security interests contribute to the arms race. Those actors who wish to achieve a
balance of power to prevent major violence may, and do, view their arms acquisition as "legiti-
mate" and acquisition by their competitors as provocative. This, of course, is how the United States
and its clients view the situation. But it is conceivable that the U.S.S.R. might view the situation
in precisely the same terms: An effort to achieve U.A.R. parity with Israel could be seen as pursuit
of a balance of power, with U.S. arms seen as destabilizing. See note 17 supra.
2 4While this point of view is shared by a number of schools of legal thought, it receives its
strongest support from the sociological school currently "chaired" by Myres S. McDougal. See
McDougal, Some Basic Theoretical Concepts about International Law: A Policy Oriented Frame-
work of Inquiry, 4 J. CONFLICT RESOLUTION 337 (1960).
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general and ill-defined that the legal order fails to provide stable expec-
tations as to what is impermissible behavior. Perhaps the major defi-
ciency in the current legal order is the failure to illuminate clearly what
is illegal force and what constitutes aggression.25 Secondly, because the
international legal order is basically horizontal where authority is decen-
tralized among co-equal decision-makers, these authoritative decision-
makers are not likely to proceed beyond the adversary stage in those
conflicts where state security is perceived to be involved.26 And thirdly,
nonauthoritative third-party review of claims is necessarily so complex
that it is unrealistic to expect an immediate consensus to emerge in
support of a given interpretation. 7 Quasi-authoritative review by such
third-parties as the General Assembly or Security Council acting under
Chapter Six of the Charter suffers from the same problem, compounded
by the nonlegal preconceptions that state representatives bring to these
bodies. All of these characteristics lead to the conclusion that there is
not likely to be an effective legal judgment that would lead to any sort
of "injunction" against arms shipments to a given party to the Arab-
Israeli conflict.
The lack of consensus as to what constitutes impermissible force is
easily observable in claims related to the origin of the 1967 Arab-Israeli
war. It is perhaps generally accepted in the West that the United Arab
Republic was aggressive in mobilizing and deploying troops in the Sinai,
making bellicose statements, ordering the withdrawal of UN troops,
and blockading the Gulf of Aqaba to Israeli shipping. Particularly in
the light of United States arguments at the time of the Cuban missile
crisis that aggression can occur without armed attack,28 this Western
view would seem to be the correct interpretation. A counterclaim, how-
ever, has increasing validity as more facts come to light. While there is
no doubt that provocative statements and actions were undertaken by
the United Arab Republic which could conceivably be termed aggres-
251t is not necessarily true that international law is any more general than domestic law. The
meaning of "force" and "aggression" is no more or less clear than the meaning of "interstate
commerce," "pursuit of happiness" or "equal protection of the laws" on a prima facie basis. See
Fried, How Efficient is International Law?, in THE RELEVANCE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 93 (1968).
"iFor a conception of International law in terms of an adversary process see Falk, The Relevance
of Political Context to the Nature and Functioning of International Law: An Intermediate View,
in THE RELEVANCE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 133 (1968).
"This is obviously the case with nonauthoritative review of the U.S. role in Vietnam. See, e.g.,
I & 2 THE VIETNAM WAR AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (R. Falk ed. 1968-1969).21For a critical overview of legal arguments made during that crisis, see Gerberding,
International Law and the Cuban Missile Crisis, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICAL CRISIS
181 (1968).
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sion through a nonlegalistic process of legal reasoning, 29 it is not certain
that Israel was free from legitimate charges of aggressive behavior. At
the time of the Israeli first strike against the air forces of the U.A.R.
and Syria, the U.A.R. was engaged in negotiation with the United
States to avoid violence, and there was some probability that the crisis
could be resolved without coercion. Israel was informed of the impend-
ing visit of an Egyptian official to Washington and, according to one
source, had agreed to await the outcome of that visit before taking any
decisive action. 0 In this context, the evaluation of Israel's claim of the
permissibility of a preemptive first strike as a legitimate act of self-
defense becomes at least more complex and perhaps more dubious, since
the strike may have occurred at a time of decreasing probability of
violence. It is certainly more difficult to argue that arms should be
denied to the U.A.R. because it has no legitimate defense needs at this
point or that it wishes the arms only for aggressive purposes. 31
The other problematical characteristics of the legal order already
identified-its horizontal nature and lack of a third-party consen-
sus-are best treated in conjunction and can be examined by inquiry
into the merits of Palestinian claims to employ violence.32 The growth
of Palestinian nationalism and guerrilla organizations has been marked
since 1965-1967.33 While no one group or ideological position is fully
representative of the Palestinian movement, at least three basic claims
can be ascertained when various statements and doctrines are converted
to legal arguments. The first claim is that there is a right to employ
"See the discussion of aggression in M. McDOUGAL & F. FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM
WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 170-71 (1961).
3'M. COPELAND, THE GAME OF NATIONS 276-77 (1969); cf. Christian Science Monitor, Oct. 3,
1970, at 1, col. 1. See also W. LAQUEUR, THE ROAD TO WAR (1969); Yost, The Arab-Israeli War:
How It Began, 46 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 305, 317-18 (1967-68).
"This treatment of the immediate origin of the 1967 war is intentionally limited for purposes
of illustration. A full treatment of the question of aggression in the Arab-Israeli conflict is infinitely
complex, given non-Western perspective on the subject. A number of parties view the question in
extended historical perspective, arguing that Zionist capture of much of Palestine constituted initial
aggression and that violence is now permitted as self-defense against that continuing aggression.
Some Western legal scholars have accepted that argument within certain time spans. See, e.g., Q.
WRIGHT, THE MIDDLE EAST: PROSPECTS FOR PEACE 21-22 (1. Shapiro ed. 1969).
"
2Identification and evaluation of Palestinian claims to use violence are immensely complex. The
presentation here is drawn from a longer study, The Palestinians and the Arab States, by J.L.
Taulbee and D.P. Forsythe. The paper, which was presented at the 1971 National Convention of
the International Studies Association, is forthcoming in ETHNICITY AND NATION-BUILDING: LOCAL
AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES (Bell & Freeman eds. 1972).
'See Harkabi, Fedayeen Action and Arab Strategy, Adelphi Papers No. 53 (1968); Hudson,
The Palestinian Arab Resistance Movement: Its Significance in the Middle East Crisis, 29 MIDDLE
EAST J. 291 (1969); Sharabi, Palestine Guerrillas, in SUPPLEMENTARY PAPERS (Georgetown Center
for Strategic and International Studies 1970).
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violence to "liberate" Palestine in the "just war" of national self-
determination and anti-imperialism. The second is the right to coerce
Israel into accepting the principle of refugee choice regarding repatria-
tion or compensation. The third is the right to use violence to resist
illegal Israeli occupation in Arab territory since the 1967 war.
It is intellectually possible to make judgments about these competing
claims by invoking international legal principles and modifying them
to fit the particulars of the Arab-Israeli conflict. For example, the fol-
lowing line of analysis will reject the first two claims, but accept the
third with modifications. Logically, arms could be denied for the first
two causes, but not for the third.
The claim to use violence for Palestinian national self-determination
cannot be accepted by any legal system that values order. Israel has
achieved legitimacy through effective control of territory since 1948;
this control has been collectively approved by UN membership and has
been widely approved through bilateral recognition.34 Moreover, the
idea of self-determination, while no doubt of wide acceptance, is so
qualified in application that its legal status has always been clouded.35
Further, the Security Council has rarely dealt with Israel as a colonial
state as it has with South Africa, Rhodesia, and Portugal. Still further,
acceptance of Security Council Resolution 242 of November 22,
1967,36 by almost all states, including the Soviet Union, the United
Arab Republic, and Jordan confirms the legitimacy of Israel.
The claim to use violence as a sanction to enforce the right of refugee
choice between repatriation and compensation is more complex. One
area of controversy concerns the status of General Assembly Resolution
19411 and its paragraph eleven, which approved the right of repatriation
for refugees from the 1948 war, or of resettlement with compensation,
provided those opting for repatriation desired to live in peace. Like
other Assembly resolutions passed repeatedly by large majorities includ-
ing the major states, General Assembly Resolution 194 is now argued
by some to constitute an expression of customary international law
which is legally binding. On the other hand, Israel has long argued,
"
4For a complete explanation of this position, see WRIGHT, supra note 31, at 10-1I.
"
5Even those governments that support the principles of self-determination against white, minor-
ity regimes limit the application of the principles in other situations. For a general discussion, see
Emerson, The New Higher Law of Anti-Colonialism, in THE RELEVANCE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
152 (1968). The recent conventions on political and cultural rights, adopted by the General Assem-
bly, both affirm the right of self-determination, but definitions and ratifications are lacking.
3622 U.N. SCOR, 1382d meeting 8 (1967).
'"G.A. Res. 194, U.N. Doc. A/810 at 21 (1948).31The following sources provide useful discussion on the status of Assembly resolutions. 0.
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inter alia, that the refugees are hostile to the state of Israel and that
repatriation is unacceptable for security reasons-which is permitted by
the terms of the Resolution. 9 The failure of the Arab parties to define
clearly their intentions with regard to the future of the refugee problem,
coupled with the fact that large-scale and rapid repatriation could logi-
cally lead to a challenge to the state of Israel, gives basis to the Israeli
position, once the legitimacy of Israel is accepted as an imperative for
regional order. This reasoning, however, does not lead to permission for
rejection of the right of refugee choice per se. Zionism does bear some
direct responsibility for the departure of some Arab refugees." More-
over, one plan for implementation of refugee preference under General
Assembly Resolution 194 provided Israel with a veto right over any
refugee deemed potentially subversive by Israel, in a limited and gradual
process of mutual repatriation and resettlement." In the last analysis,
General Assembly Resolution 194 would seem a reasonable framework
for settlement of the refugee problem, with modifications.12 But no
claim to unilateral enforcement of rights under General Assembly Reso-
lution 194 can be entertained until Arab parties cease to use refugee
repatriation as a weapon against the security of Israel. This is not only
impermissible under the terms of the Resolution but also constitutes an
unreasonable demand on the state of Israel. International legal guide-
lines can only be effective on the basis of mutual reciprocity. When Arab
parties demonstrate clearly a recognition of the right of Israel to secu-
rity, then Israel has a reciprocal obligation to counteract the hardships
which its existence created. Moreover, no order of relationships will
prove stable if principles of equity are ignored. Israel cannot achieve
legal endorsement of its claim to a rightful place in the Middle East on
ASAMOAH, THE LEGAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE DECLARATIONS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE
UNITED NATIONS (1966); J. CASTANEDA, LEGAL EFFECTS OF UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS
(1969); R. HIGGINS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW THROUGH THE POLITICAL OR-
GANS OF THE UNITED NATIONS (1963); Lande, The Effect of Resolutions of the United Nations
General Assembly, 19 WORLD POLITICS 83-105 (1966); White, A Framework for Analyzing Inter-
national Law-in-Action: A Preliminary Proposal, 13 INT'L STUDIES Q. 46 (1969).
"Israel also claims that G.A. Res. 194 is not binding and that Israel does not have responsibility
for the creation of the refugee problem. For a new overview of the refugee situation see D.
FORSYTHE, UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING: THE CCP AND OTHER SUBSIDIARY ORGANS, (forth-
coming); Forsythe, UNRWA, The Palestine Refugees and World Politics: 1949-1969, 25 INT'L
ORGANIZATION 26 (1971).
'*SeeG. Stevens, Arab Refugees: 1948-1952, 6 MIDDLE EASTJ. 281-86 (1952). See also J. DAVIS,
THE EVASIVE PEACE 53-60 (1968).
"For further discussion on this point, see D. FORSYTHE, supra note 39, and Johnson, Arab vs.
Israeli: A Persistent Challenge to Americans, 18 MIDDLE EAST J. 1 (1964).
"
2Nothing in G.A. Res. 194 would preclude resettlement from leading to the creation of an Arab
state of Palestine on the West Bank should Jordan agree to that contingency.
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the basis of power politics alone, and only attention to the status of the
Palestine refugees will bring that formal endorsement from the Arab
world.
Finally, the claim to use violence to resist illegal Israeli occupation
of territory since 1967 must be evaluated in terms of two competing
principles. The first is the clear norm in international law that acquisi-
tion of territory by force and conquest does not grant title. 3 The com-
peting principle is that occupation is legal pending conclusion of a treaty
terminating the state of war." The question of when, if at all, Israeli
occupation becomes illegal rather than legal centers on whether or not
Israeli claims in the bargaining leading toward a settlement are: (a)
accepted by Arab parties to the treaty, or (b) compatible with interna-
tional law should a treaty not be forthcoming. There is, in law, no
obligation for Arab parties to accept by treaty a situation that would
otherwise be illegal. Further, there is no legal claim that Israel can make
with validity to support its presence in certain occupied territories, once
the uncontested owner of the territory has accepted the legitimacy of
Israel and renounced belligerency toward the Zionist state. Thus Israel
has no claim to any part of Sinai, including Sharm-el-Sheik, since
U.A.R. acceptance of Security Council Resolution 24211 and offer of
treaty; and it is difficult to see why any conception of the legal order
should preclude violent resistance to Israeli occupation, in that area.
Questions relating to the future of the Golan Heights would seem simi-
lar to Sinai, especially in the light of increased facts about the Syrian-
Israeli conflict in that area-viz., Israeli take-over of contested land for
farming as a precursor of Syrian shelling from the Heights.4 However,
Syrian rejection of Security Council Resolution 242 must be taken into
account. Questions pertaining to the West Bank and East Jerusalem are
of a different nature in that Jordan's claim to these areas was contested
in the pre-1967 period in much of the Arab world. Thus with regard to
these latter areas there would seem to be room for de novo reasoning,
within the confines of certain legal principles. 7
It is suggested here that the above, all-too-brief outline of one line of
legal reasoning about Palestinian claims to use violence demonstrates






sThere is little literature on this subject. It is partially treated in an analysis of U.N. supervision
of armistice lines in the Middle East in D. BROOK, PREFACE TO PEACE 85-113 (1964).
47This point is developed further in Taulbee & Forsythe, The Palestinians and the Arab States,
supra note 32.
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the way in which international law can function to provide a framework
of analysis for what is a reasonable resolution of competing claims. But
it is also suggested here that because the very existence of both Zionism
and Palestinian nationalism is considered to be at stake, neither of these
primary parties will consent to move beyond the adversary stage of
making self-serving claims, to the adjudicatory stage of impartial, au-
thoritative third-party review. Moreover, because the Palestinian move-
ment has become intertwined with the collective pride and identity of
various Arab ethnic groups, the Palestinians will have sufficient support
to resist capitulation to Israeli claims. And as noted in the earlier section
of this essay, they will be able to acquire arms from outside the region,
in part because of their ideological orientation. Thus the competing
claims can continue unresolved in any definitive manner.
Also, it cannot be expected that detached students of international
law will readily agree on this line of reasoning any more than one
expects a legal consensus on the United States role in Viet Nam. Some
students of law are obviously not detached from the emotional contents
of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Others disagree over the importance of
competing principles when there is not a definitive guide to the conflict
of norms. This variety of legal interpretation, while not unusual, does
little to create reinforcement for those arguments articulated by states
that are in keeping with the needs of minimum order and equity.
WHAT FUTURE FOR ARMS CONTROL?
It is difficult to identify one factor, of any type, that is conducive to
formal, institutionalized arms control in the Arab-Israeli conflict. On
the contrary, one can enumerate factors tending to preclude such re-
straints. The Arab-Israeli zone of Middle East politics is revolutionary,
in varying ways and in varying forms, but still, revolutionary. The inter-
national legal order cannot authoritatively ascertain either primary or
major state aggression, nor can it satisfactorily review adversary claims
regarding guerrilla violence and state responsibility in that regard. No
agreements to bar arms to certain parties will be forthcoming, therefore,
from this type of legal reasoning. In addition to these two fundamental
obstacles to arms control, there are others. In particular, the nature of
the arms in question has proved difficult to subsume under legal regula-
tion. No definition has been achieved, nor is one probably possible, to
distinguish offensive from defensive weapons, prior to their usage. 8
'"There are some weapons that are basically defensive, such as ABM systems. But most weapons
can be defensive or offensive, particularly since a second-strike offensive is now the core of defen-
sive strategy. In the Arab-Israeli conflict, efforts to distinguish offensive from defensive weapons
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Then too, small and conventional and relatively inexpensive arms are
the most difficult to regulate, as they have high military utility for
legitimate defense needs in the Third World. 9
Paradoxically, all of the above does not eliminate arms control per
se from the Arab-Israeli conflict. In fact, arms control of a tacit nature
has always been part of that struggle. 0 Both the Soviet Union and the
United States have barred certain weapons from transfer, primarily
nuclear weapons. The Soviets have also refrained from providing their
clients with intermediate or long-range surface-to-surface missiles, as
opposed to surface-to-air anti-aircraft missiles. The Soviets also seem
to have refrained from providing the Egyptians with any great supply
of amphibious assault vehicles that could be used across the Suez Canal
and have apparently kept Soviet pilots away from the canal. And both
the Soviets and the Americans have delayed shipments of arms during
crucial periods of bargaining, in order to signal serious intention and to
spur confidence in mutual trust. The process was quite evident during
the spring and summer of 1970 leading up to the start of a regional
cease-fire. Thus the two primary suppliers have unilaterally and tacitly
imposed some restraints on themselves, sometimes at the cost of friction
in the supplier-client relationship. Of course it cannot be denied that the
quantity and sophistication of arms in the Arab-Israeli zone have still
increased over time.5'
There is some slight possibility that a limited or general Arab-Israeli
agreement might lead to more formal control over arms shipments, but
it would seem that this possibility is not a very great probability .5 There
is a general reluctance among states to commit themselves to formal
rather than informal restraints. 3 Emphasis is placed on flexibility
rather than on the advantage of stable expectations of state behavior. 4
Flexibility may be desired for fear the agreement will be violated and
are, in general, futile exercises in semantics. See Kemp, Arms Traffic and Third World Conflicts,
supra note 17, at 22-25.
" For an excellent chart, see Kemp, Arms Traffic and Third World Conflicts, supra note 17, at
43.
500n the subject of tacit, informal arms control, see Fisher, Arms Control and Disarmament in
International Law, in 4 STRATEGY OF WORLD ORDER: DISARMAMENT AND ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT 69 (1966).
51See J. HUREWITZ, supra note 1, at 438-88.
5 On the question of whether a negotiated settlement must precede successful arms control, or
vice versa, see D. EDWARDS, supra note 18, at 161-63.
53The subject is treated thoroughly in Deutsch, The Probability of International Law, in THE
RELEVANCE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 57 (1968).
5 See L. HENKIN, HOW NATIONS BEHAVE 269 (1968).
55E.g., INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICAL CRISIS (L. Scheinman & D. Wilkinson eds. 1968).
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the same conflict will be resumed. And flexibility may be desired be-
cause of not wanting to be restricted in similar conflicts in other areas.
In this latter regard, the Soviets would probably be reluctant to limit
formally arms transfers to "liberation" movements like that of the
Palestinians for fear of setting a precedent that could prove bothersome
when related to Soviet support of other such movements.
WHAT ROLE FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW?
Any inquiry that focuses on international law only as a restraint
system in time of crisis is destined to arrive at a pessimistic conclusion.5
Of the many functions of international law, restraining states in the
process of coercion is only one. This task of law is clearly the least
capably performed in the international legal order, not only because of
the easily apparent deficiencies in the collective management of sanc-
tions, but also because all law tends to be ignored when threats to
existence and security occur. 7
Yet the use of legal analysis by nonauthoritative third-parties may
contribute to what has been called "a climate of opinion" in world
politics5S-what might be termed an international political culture. One
of the functions of law is to serve as a socializing agent, a communicator
of basic assumptions about the nature of proper authority and appropri-
ate rules of the "game" of politics. It may be that this is the most
important function of international law in crisis situations," in that legal
reasoning by third-parties may lead states to increased awareness of
their shared, long-term, real national interests. In the perspective of
immediate problems, however, law will be extremely marginal in pro-
ducing formal, institutionalized commitments to arms control in the
Arab-Israeli conflict.
"See, e.g., W. COPLIN, THE FUNCTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 26-167 (1966), wherein the
author identifies law that establishes jurisdiction, regulates coercion, and maximizes socio-
economic development. See also Hoffmann, International Systems and International Law, supra
note 3, at 205.
7See generally Deutsch, The Probability. of International Law, supra note 53.
"See generally W. COPLIN, supra note 56, at 186-94; Coplin, International Law and Assump-
tions about the State System, 17 WORLD POLITICS 615 (1964-65).
"See INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ORGANIZATION 2-3, 9-11 (R. Falk & W. Harneider eds. 1968).
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